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This paper presents the axiomatization of a choice procedure in the presence of observable
but not feasible alternatives, phantom or aspirations, and assimetrically dominated feasible
options, decoys or references. The main characteristic of the representation theorem here
stated is that aspirations induce references, which attract agent’s attention for a specific
feasible subset, where she acts like a standard utility maximizer. It turns out that some
external factor invisible to the model maker may influence the choice, which means the
decision maker may pick an aspiration which attracts dominated alternatives. Moreover,
we highlight the existence of a psychological and endogenous metric which evaluates
similarity between alternatives and provide further explanation on the eventual choice of
strictly dominated alternatives.




Esse artigo axiomatiza o procedimento de escolha que contempla alternativas observáveis
mas que não são factíveis, chamadas de aspirações ou alternativas fantasma, e opções factí-
veis assimetricamente dominadas, que são referências ou iscas. A principal característica do
teorema de representação obtido é que as aspirações induzem referências, as quais atraem
a atenção do agente para um conjunto específico de alternativas factíveis, no qual o agente
maximiza sua função de utilidade. Assim sendo, a escolha do agente depende de fatores
externos que são invisíveis ao modelador, o que significa que o indivíduo pode escolher
uma aspiração que atrai alternativas dominadas. Mais ainda, demonstra-se a existência
de uma métrica endógena e individual que avalia a similaridade entre as alternativas e
analisa-se o procedimento de escolha no qual a escolha é uma alternativa estritamente
dominada à luz do modelo.
Palavras-chave: Correspondências de Escolha, Alternativa Isca, Alternativa Fantasma,
Métrica endógena, Alternativa Estritamente Dominada.
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1 Introduction
Its well known that the regularity hypothesis can fail on choice models . The
regularity hypothesis says that the introduction of a new alternative into the feasible set
cannot shift preferences towards some alternative previously feasible. However, there are
violations violations of this behavior. Generally, the inclusion of some specific alternatives
on a choice problem draw attention of the agent to other ones, may it be feasible or not.
Decisions often tend not to follow standard predictions of traditional rational models
based on the regularity hypothesis. However, often we can model these violations as choice
problems where rationality plays a different role when compared with traditional utility
maximization.
Under the stochastic theory of choice, for instance, Manzini and Mariotti (2018)
shows that a model which originally satisfies the regularity hypothesis gets some nice
descriptive power once that property is dropped, while still maintaining some consistency
properties. Concerning consumer behavior, their model accommodates the inclusion of
choice reversals induced by the introduction of some alternatives and is able to explain
some social phenomena in which a specific alternative becomes more attractive not by self
modifications, but due to changes on the surrounding environment.
Huber, Payne and Puto (1982) presents one of the first violations of the regularity
hypothesis. They show that the regularity hypothesis does not hold when considering the
attraction effect. However, Huber, Payne and Puto (1982) developed a model in which an
alternative originally not chosen in the presence of a second one can be chosen in a similar
setup when we add an asymmetrically dominated option to the situation.
This kind of alternative is said to be a dominated decoy, particularly an asymmetri-
cally dominated decoy. Generally speaking, a decoy r is an alternative which is dominated
by some feasible y, in the sense that all the attributes of y are greater than or equal the
attributes of r, with at least one strictly greater, but is not dominated by another option.
There exists in the literature another kind of decoy, said non-dominated decoy, which does
not require a dominating alternative. Both of them are examples of choice reversals, which
violates the regularity hypothesis.
The asymmetric dominance or attraction effect is an example of endogenous
reference dependence. Ok, Ortoleva and Riella (2015) axiomatize a setup with dominated
decoys, in which some alternatives are able to exert the attraction effect, called reference
points, once they are feasible. Pettibone and Wedell (2000) analyze the effects of non-
dominated decoys over the choice of agents, in particular unavailable decoys which dominate
all the other alternatives. It turns out that it draws attention to the most similar feasible
one. This specific attraction effect is called aspirational and axiomatically modeled by
Guney, Richter and Tsur (2018).
Another common reference dependence on literature is the status quo bias. Masa-
tlioglu and Ok (2005), Masatlioglu and Ok (2014), Riella and Teper (2014) model these
well documented phenomena. In this setup, the current state of an agent becomes a
standard for ranking other alternatives. Riella and Teper (2014), for instance, consider
an alternative to be a candidate to replace status quo only if the chances of the agent
incurring a severe loss when compared to the status quo is not too high.
At the present work, we analyze both kinds of decoys previously described, that
is those which are aspirations and those which are reference points. It turns out that
aspirations, options she wants but cannot pursue, induce reference points. The wide
implications of the inclusion of aspiration and reference points enrich firm models (Hart
and Moore (2007), Hart (2008), Hart (2009)), consumer choice under price discrimination
(Carbajal and Ely (2016)), financial modeling (Mihm (2016)), game theory (Sawa and
Zusai (2014)) and welfare analysis (Genicot and Ray (2017)), for example.
Previous works which do experiments on how references and attraction effect change
decision maker preferences are many. Wedell (1991) analyzes the role of assymetrically
dominated alternatives when individuals gamble, Sueocurry and Pitts (1995) does the
same for voting setups, Trueblood (2012) considers investigative scenarios and Highhouse
(1996) for job market.
All these models fit better specific situations and allow the rationality hypothesis
to explain apparent violations. Therefore, in some cases where traditional models do not
fit it, does not mean agents behave irrationally They just suggest that agents rationality
acts in a different manner, such that the mechanism of choice of agents could be more
sophisticated.
This paper aims to give a further contribution to the aspiration based model of
Guney, Richter and Tsur (2018). We develop a choice model in which observable but
not feasible alternatives, aspirations, have influence over the choice of the agents. Under
some reasonable conditions, it turns out that first, the agent identify, on the observables
subset, their aspirations, which maximize their utility function. Any feasible aspirations
are chosen. If that is not the case, the agent proceed to identify, on the feasible subset,
the most similar alternatives to each one of the aspirations, the references, according to
an endogenous metric. Those references draw the attention of the agent for a subset of
the alternatives. Finally the agent acts like a standard utility maximizer when looking to
the feasible attracted options.
The novel aspects of our model when comparing to Guney, Richter and Tsur (2018)
is the possibility of the existence of more than one aspiration and, therefore, more than one
reference. Furthermore, unlike them, here the references are not necessarily chosen. They
highlight some other alternatives, where the agent maximizes her utility. The existence
of the attraction region, precludes he existence of a choice problem where an strictly
dominated alternative is chosen, what we show as some inconsistency of Guney, Richter
and Tsur (2018) model.
Haselhuhn (2014) addresses the importance of unpacking a single aspiration into
many others. The study shows that market participants obtain higher chances of success in
getting closing to their aspirations and, then, achieving better payoffs when they consider
not only a single best path, but many. Concerning the possibility of agents having multiple
reference points, Koop and Johnson (2010) point out that they can impact behavior even
within the same choice context.
This setup allows us to capture different aspects the agent may value when maxi-
mizing her utility, that is, status quo, alternatives that are high ranked in some aspects by
the individual but perform poorly on other and so on. Next we give some more examples
to motivate how aspirations and references can be used to explain some situations where
rationality seems not to hold.
Suppose a family faces a downgrade on its income, which makes the consumption
of the previously optimal bundle unfeasible. They will initially, over their new income
constraint, look for a bundle that is similar to the original. It turns out that, after
identifying this reference bundle, the family may choose a bundle that is simply much
better than the reference, despite being significantly different than the other one.
Consider now someone willing to run for president of a country, but prohibited by
some legal requirement. The closest feasible alternative, then, becomes running for the
governor’s office of one of the country’s provinces. However, could be better for her to run
for a chair on the lower house. In fact, when raking these two options she considers a chair
on the lower house a dominant option, so che chooses it, despite the governor position
having the power of being a reference point.
On both examples above, note that the two stage procedure is crucial. When
comparing the alternatives with the reference, agents consider different aspects of their
preference when, for instance, they compare the same alternatives with their aspiration.
On the second example, if the governor is subordinate to the president and the members
of the lower house are, in any sense, subordinate to both, when comparing running for
governor or the lower house, once both are subordinate to the president, this aspect could
no longer be crucial when ranking the last two and it turns out that the lower house chair
offers better payoffs.
Same holds for the bundle example. When comparing the two cheaper bundles,
one key aspect of the decision is: which bundle makes the family closer to get the original
bundle in the future. On such situations, a lot of psychological factors come into play, and
they do not mean the rationality is gone.
Another situation that clarifies how important is to consider that not always the
most similar option to the aspiration is actually chosen is to consider the scientific modeling
itself. A good question when researching natural or human phenomena tries to answer
why things we observe actually happen, that is, scientific research tries to uncover laws
behind the reality.
Of course, when it comes to modeling the reality, the true process behind it is not
feasible but observable. One can make several assumptions that becomes her abstraction
of reality closest to the facts. However, more assumptions we make in order to minimize
the distance from our model to reality makes the problem less tractable and the real
purpose to explain the facts fail. It turns out that an ultra realistic model could lead the
researcher to a simpler model, with some strong but reasonable and intuitive axioms, that,
although more distant from the reality, explains it better, is more accessible and could
ensure a Nobel prize in the future.
Such situations motivates the main goal of this paper, which ensure more flexibility
to the choice of the decision maker, enabling her not to necessarily choose the most similar
alternative to the aspiration, like Guney, Richter and Tsur (2018). While doing so, we
can also derive the endogenous metric that they obtain, which evaluates a psychological
distance between alternatives. In addition, we explore further properties of the model here
developed.
The metric obtained gives the foundation of the metric with economic meaning
described by the fancy work of Loi and Matta (2008), for example, which provides that
from any metric, there exists a Riemannian metric on the equilibrium manifold (originally
described by Balasko (1975), Balasko (1979)). This study enriches and gives further
development to market equilibrium analysis and a fine geometrical comprehension of it
with some novel approach.
The equilibrium manifold is said to be simply the usual set of pairs of prices and
endowments in which aggregate demand equals aggregate supply. It turns out that this set
behave locally like Euclidean space and allows to formally describe the transition of some
equilibrium point to another better one through a smooth transition, which is empirically
desired from the viewpoint of agents.
However, they simply consider an a priori metric with economic meaning and do
not investigate why there is such a metric and which are its properties, as stated at Loi and
Matta (2008, p.1380). The aspiration-based model with reference-dependence, then, grants
the existence of a metric endogenously obtained from choice problem with which agents
measure psycological distances between alternatives. From that metric with economic
meaning, for example, Loi and Matta (2008) shows that we can obtain a Riemannian
metric on the equilibrium manifold and talk about geodesics on such a setup.
This work is structured as follows. On the next chapter we state the axioms and
the setup of the model. Chapter 3 provides the representation theorems and Chapter 4
presents further properties of our model. There we present further explanations on the
choice of strictly dominated alternatives, discuss that the attraction effect becomes stronger
as the distance of the aspiration and the reference becomes greater which was previously
suggested by Pettibone and Wedell (2000), Pettibone and Wedell (2007) and Sperlich and
Uriarte (2019) and talk about the transitiveness of the attaction effect. Finally, Chapter 5
contains some concluding remarks.

2 The Aspiration-based References Model:
Setup and Definitions
We will follow the setup in Guney, Richter and Tsur (2018) with a finite space
of alternatives X. The set of all non-empty subsets of X is denoted by P(X). A choice
problem is defined as a pair (S, T ), S, T ∈ P(X), S ⊆ T . The interpretation is that when
the agent faces this choice problem, she observes all the alternatives in T but only the
alternatives in S are available for choice. The set of all choice problems is denoted by
C(X). A choice correspondence is an application c : C(X) → P(X) such that for each
(S, T ) ∈ C(X), c(S, T ) ⊆ S.
This framework allows us to consider choice procedures that are affected by una-
vailable alternatives. In what follows, we will make use of a collection of binary relations
we identify from the agent’s choices.
Definition 1. Let T ∈ P(X) and x, y ∈ T . We define a binary relation T⊆ X ×X by
x T y if, and only if, there exists S ⊆ T with y ∈ S such that one of the following holds:
i) x /∈ c(S ∪ {x}, T ) 6= c(S, T ) or ii) x ∈ c(S ∪ {x}, T ) 6= c({x} ∪ c(S, T ), {x} ∪ c(S, T )).
This binary relation essentially captures the existence of at least one situation
where one can argue that x acts as a reference point in the presence of y. In the (i) case,
the choice from (S, T ) is different from the choice from (S ∪ {x}, T ) and x is not chosen
in (S ∪ {x}, T ). The presence of x is somehow affecting the relative ranking of the other
options. That is, x is acting as a reference point. Something similar is happening in (ii) as
well. There, although x is a choice from (S ∪ {x}, T ), the choice from (S ∪ {x}, T ) differs
from the choice from ({x} ∪ c(S, T ), {x} ∪ c(S, T )). If we understand the choice from
({x} ∪ c(S, T ), {x} ∪ c(S, T )) as being free from aspiration-based effects and, consequently,
reference free, we again identify x as a reference point in (S ∪ {x}, T ).
Now we proceed to the axioms that ensure some structure to the decision maker’s
behavior.
2.1 Axioms
The first two postulates were previously introduced by Guney, Richter and Tsur
(2018).
Axiom 1. (WARP for Aspirations – A-WARP) For any S, T ∈ P(X), S ⊆ T ,
c(T, T ) ∩ S 6= ∅ implies that c(S, S) = c(T, T ) ∩ S.
Axiom 2. (Independence of Non-aspirational Alternatives – INA) For any
S, T1, T2 ∈ P(X), S ⊆ T1 ∩ T2, c(T1, T1) = c(T2, T2) implies c(S, T1) = c(S, T2).
Call a choice problem of the form (T, T ) an unrestricted choice problem, that is, all
observable options are available for choice. Furthermore, aspirations are the choices from
the observable subset. That said, Axiom 1 simply says that the standard Weak Axiom of
Revealed Preference is satisfied when we look at the restriction of c to unrestricted choice
problems. On the other hand, Axiom 2 imposes that only alternatives which are chosen
when all observable alternatives are available may influence the decion maker’s choices in
restricted choice problems.
The next postulate imposes that reference effects in problems with a single aspiration
be acyclic.
Axiom 3. (Reference Acyclicity) For any T ∈ P(X) such that |c(T, T )| = 1, T is
acyclic.
The three axioms above discipline behavior in choice problems with a single
aspiration point. The two postulates below present two alternative ways to deal with
problems with multiple aspirations.
Axiom 4. (A-Separability) For any Y, Y ′, S ∈ P(X) such that S ⊂ Y, Y ′, if c(Y, Y ) ∩
c(Y ∪ Y ′, Y ∪ Y ′) 6= ∅ and c(Y ′, Y ′)∩ c(Y ∪ Y ′, Y ∪ Y ′) 6= ∅ then c(S, Y ∪ Y ′) = c(S, Y )∪
c(S, Y ′).
Axiom 5. (A-Optimality) For any Y, Y ′, S ∈ P(X) such that S ⊂ Y, Y ′, if c(Y, Y ) ∩
c(Y ∪Y ′, Y ∪Y ′) 6= ∅ and c(Y ′, Y ′)∩ c(Y ∪Y ′, Y ∪Y ′) 6= ∅ then c(S, Y ∪Y ′) = c(c(S, Y )∪
c(S, Y ′), c(S, Y ) ∪ c(S, Y ′)).
First, the A on the above axioms stands for aspirations. A-Separability means
that the aspirations the agent identify on a choice problem influence the choices she make
independently. For a choice problem with more than one aspiration, we have that, on a
given day, some external factor, not seen by the model maker, leans her to focus at an
specific aspiration, ignoring all other ones. We note that, although Axiom 4 is written for
two observable sets. A simple inductive argument guarantees it generalizes for any finite
number of observable sets.
In contrast, A-Optimality imposes that the decision maker takes into account the
choices induced by each aspiration in isolation, but chooses only the optimal ones among
them. We are now ready to state our two main results.
A-Separability stands for the mood-driven aspirations, similar to mood-driven
choices, described by Mihm and Ozbek (2018). As they said, there are many mood-driven
factors – such as addiction, temptation, or inattention – that can cause the agent to make
inferior choices leading to a conflict with long-term objectives. The same way they analyze
the role of self-regulation (when agents predict the mood could mess up the choice) for




In what follows, we state our two main representation theorems and discuss their
main properties.
Theorem 1. (A – Separability) A choice correspondence satisfies Axioms 1, 2, 3 and 4 if
and only if there exists a function u ∈ RX , an injective similarity function vy ∈ RX for
each y ∈ X and a correspondence Q : X ×X ⇒ X such that
c(S, T ) =
⋃
a∈a(T )
arg max u (S ∩Q(r(S, a), a)), for any (S, T ) ∈ C(X),
where a(T ) = arg max
x∈T
u(x) and, for each a ∈ a(T ), r(S, a) = arg max
x∈S
va(x).
Theorem 2. (A – Optimality) A choice correspondence satisfies Axioms 1, 2, 3 and 5
if and only if there exists a function u ∈ RX , a injective similarity function vy ∈ RX for
each y ∈ X and a correspondence Q : X ×X ⇒ X such that




, for any (S, T ) ∈ C(X),
where a(T ) = arg max
x∈T
u(x) and, for each a ∈ a(T ), r(S, a) = arg max
x∈S
va(x).
In the representation above, the DM has a utility function u. Given a choice
problem (S, T ), she first maximizes u over all the alternatives she can perceive in order to
identify her aspiration points. For each aspiration point a ∈ T the DM associates a unique
feasible alternative which is the most similar one to that aspiration. That option is r(S, a)
and called a reference, which, together with the aspiration, creates an additional mental
constraint represented by Q(r(S, a), a). Then, the DM limits herself to choose only from
the feasible alernatives on that region, what is done by maximizing the utility function u
on S ∩Q(r(S, a), a).
When the choice problem has more than one aspiration, it turns out that the
representation above is agnostic about which aspiration will be active and simply consider
choosable the choices induced by each aspiration.
The main difference between Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 stands on the final stage of
the choice procedure. If A-Optimality holds, the decision maker will identify all aspirations
but the ones which attract the highest utility options are the ones that really matter for
choice. However, in case A-Separabiliy holds, her choice may depend on some external
factor, which leads her to focus on a single aspiration in a given day.
Under this setup we can provide further characterization on how agent identifies
the most similar alternative to another on our model. It turns out that the similarity
between alternatives can be evaluated by a psychological metric, the same way previously
described by Guney, Richter and Tsur (2018).
Corollary 1. Let (S, T ) ∈ C(X) such that a(T ) = arg max
x∈T
u(x). Then, there exists a
metric d ∈ RX2 such that for each a ∈ a(T ) there is a single ra = arg min
x∈S
d(x, a).
We, then, keep the nice structure regarding the metric with economic meaning
previously obtained at Guney, Richter and Tsur (2018). On the next chapter, we explore
the properties of the choice procedure with these representations.
4 Properties
4.1 On the choice of strictly dominated alternatives
On this section we provide further explanation on the case agents may choose
a strictly dominated alternative by another feasible one. To do so, we start with the
problem in which a traditional agent whose preference is continuous, strictly convex and
strictly monotonic. We know that these hypothesis ensures the existence of a strictly
increasing utility function that represents agent’s preference. Furthermore, let the set of
all alternatives be any finite subset of Rn and the endogenous metric d to be the Euclidean
metric. Under the Guney, Richter and Tsur (2018) model we can state the following
proposition.
Proposition 1. For any aspiration, there always exists a choice problem where the
individual chooses a strictly dominated option.
When considering the agent chooses solely based on the minimization of the distance
between aspiration and reference, there always exists a choice problem with the reference
and an alternative which strictly dominates it, in which the last one is not chosen. There
is no reasonable explanation for such a situation. It turns out that under aspiration-based
model with reference dependence can’t be shown that such a situation always exist but
moreover, whenever it happens, it is explained because the dominant option is not attracted
by the reference. Once the agent is a standard utility maximizer on the attracted region,
if it is attracted by the reference, it will necessarily be chosen.





Figura 1 – The existence of a strictly dominant alternative which is not chosen.
consider the set of alternatives be a subset of R2 (see Figure 1). When a is the aspiration
and the model imposes the agent chooses the closest feasible option to it, say r, we can
always obtain an alternative x dominated by the aspiration whose coordinates are strictly
higher than those of r but x is not chosen because it is far from a.
Why exactly an strictly dominant alternative is not attracted by some reference?
Such a question is out of this paper scope. We focused on the existence of the attraction
effect, which represents an additional stage on choice procedure.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed an axiomatization which leads to two representation
theorems for choice procedure with observable but not feasible options, which we call
aspiration-based model with reference dependence. Our main results point out that
an individual identifies aspirations, considering the whole set of observables, and then
each aspiration induce a reference which drives attention to some other feasible options.
Furthermore, the representations here stated present some novel aspects when compared
to Guney, Richter and Tsur (2018), once they allow agents to identify more than one
aspiration. The way the agent looks for aspirations leads to different representation
theorems.
Our main contribution is the endogenous attracted region, induced by the references,
agents identify, from the metric previously obtained by Guney, Richter and Tsur (2018),
and how the decision maker behaves on them. It turns out that each aspiration influence
the choice independently, however the DM could be of two types: i) the one who restrict
herself to optimal attracted options, from the attracted options from each aspiration; or
ii) the one who pick any of the aspirations due to some external factor invisible to the
model and consider only the attracted options by it.
The developed model is specially useful for applications. Once attraction effect is
transitive for references and as such follows that the procedure to identify which alternatives
are attracted by another one can be described by the evaluation of multi criteria, it leads
to many other experiments. Future works can also use the model to solve Pettibone and
Wedell (2007) puzzle on how aspiration distance from feasible subset affects the attraction
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
In order to prove Theorem 1, we first state the following lemma, which is useful to
prove Theorem 2 as well.
Lemma 1. Let (S, T ) ∈ C(X). If a choice correspondence c satisfies Axioms 1, 2 and
3 then exists a function u ∈ RX , a similarity function vy ∈ RX for each y ∈ X and a
correspondence Q : X × X ⇒ X such that if a(T ) = arg max
x∈T
u(x), there is an element
r(S, a) = arg max
x∈S
va(x) for each a ∈ a(T ). Moreover,
c(S, S ∪ {a}) = arg max u(S ∩Q(r(S, a))), a ∈ a(T )
Demonstração. Suppose a choice correspondence satisfies Axioms 1, 2 and 3. We first
define a binary relation such that x  y ⇔ x ∈ c({x, y}, {x, y}). Follows from WARP
that  is a complete preorder defined on a finite set, then there is a -maximal element
and  can be represented by an utility function u ∈ RX . Next, for y ∈ X, define Xy =
{y} ∪ {x ∈ X | u(y) > u(x)} such that the transitive closure of Xy , defined on ∆X ∪X2,
by Axiom 3, have a linear order extension. Moreover, define Ly := {(y, x) | x ∈ Xy} such
that, the union of Ly with the transitive closure of Xy is still a linear order and, then,
can be represented by an injective function vy ∈ RX .
For each pair x, y such that u(y) > u(x), we define
Q(x, y) := {z ∈ Xy : x T z and z ∈ c({x, z}, {x, y, z}) or x T z and z ∈ c({x, z}, {x, z})}
Fix T such that c(T, T ) = {a} and let r = arg maxx∈S va(x). Now we show that c(S, T ) =
arg maxx∈S∩Q(r,a) u(x). To do so, fix x ∈ c(S, T ) and y ∈ arg maxx∈S∩Q(r,a) u(x).
Let S \ {x, r} = {z1, ..., zm}. Once r is unique, by acyclicity follows that c(S \
{z1}, T ) = c(S, T )\{z1}. In fact, it follows from the both two cases on definition of salience
relation. Repeating this reasoning, we get that c({x, r}, T ) = c(S \ {z1, ..., zm}, T ) =
c(S, T ) \ {z1, ..., zm} and, then, x ∈ c({x, r}, T ). If r T x, follows that x ∈ Q(r, a).
On the other hand, if r T x, we must have x ∈ c({x, r}, {x, r}), otherwise, x T r,
which contradicts the definition of r. Similarly, acyclicity implies x ∈ c({x, y, r}, T ) =
c({x} ∪ c({y, r}, T ), {x} ∪ c({y, r}, T )). Since y ∈ c({y, r}, T ), we have that u(x) ≥ u(y),
due to Axiom 1.
Conversely, note that or y ∈ c({x}∪ c({y, r}, T ), {x}∪ c({y, r}, T )), when the same
reasoning we used before gives us that c({x, y, r}, T ) = c(S, T ) \ (S \ {x, y, r}) and then
y ∈ c(S, T ), or r T y and y ∈ c({r, y}, {r, y}), case in which we verify y ∈ c({y, r}, T )
and then y ∈ c(S, T ), otherwise, r T y, what is a contradiction.
Now we proceed to show the Theorem 1. It is routine to show only that the axioms
imply the representation, so we assume a choice correspondence c that satisfies Axioms 1,
2, 3 and 4. From Lemma 1, we get u ∈ RX , a similarity function vy ∈ RX for each y ∈ X
and a correspondence Q : X ×X ⇒ X. Next, we omit the index a ∈ a(T ) of the union to
keep it clean.
We show then that c(S, T ) = ⋃ arg max u (S ∩Q(r(S, a), a)). Fix x ∈ c(S, T ) and
y ∈ ⋃ arg max u(S ∩Q(r(S, a), a)).Note Axiom 4 can be easily extended to a finite union
with the Axiom 2, that is c (S, T ) = ⋃
a∈c(T,T )
c(S, S ∪ {a}). Then x ∈ ⋃ c(S, S ∪ {a}), which
implies x ∈ c(S, S ∪ {a}) for some a and then, the result follows.
Conversely, note y ∈ ⋃ c(S, S,∪{a}) and then y ∈ c(S, T ).
A.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Again, we show only that axioms imply the representation. Then, we just
need to show that c(S, T ) = arg max u (S ∩ (⋃Q(r(S, a), a))). Fix x ∈ c(S, T ) and
y ∈ arg max u(S ∩ (⋃Q(r(S, a), a))). By a simple inductive argument, using Axiom
1 and 2, we can extend Axiom 5 for a finite number of subsets. Follows then that
c(S, T ) = c
( ⋃
a∈c(T,T )
c(S, S ∪ {a}), ⋃
a∈c(T,T )
c(S, S ∪ {a})
)
. From this fact follows that
x ∈ c (⋃ c(S, S ∪ {a}),⋃ c(S, S ∪ {a})) and then x ∈ arg max u(⋃ c(S, S ∪ {a})), which
implies u(x) ≥ u(y).
Conversely, note y ∈ c(S, S ∪ {a}) for some a, which implies y ∈ ⋃ c(S, S,∪{a}).
We had already proven that u(x) ≥ u(y). Then u(x) = u(y) and, from the extension of
Axiom 4, then, y ∈ c(S, T ).
A.3 Proof of Corollary 1
Now, define d̂ : X ×X → R as follows:
d̂(x, y) =
vx(x)− vx(y), if u(x) ≥ u(y);vy(y)− vy(x), if u(x) < u(y)
Note that d̂ is non-negative, symmetric and reflexive and, then, a semimetric. As a
semimetric we know d̂ has an extension d that satisfies the triangle inequality (see Guney,
Richter and Tsur (2018)).
Now we just need to show that r(S, a) = arg minx∈S d(x, a). Once d is an extension
of d̂, we have that arg minx∈S d(x, a) = arg minx∈S d̂(x, a). Note that a = arg maxx∈T u(x),
then, d̂(x, a) = va(a) − va(x). Recall r(S, a) = arg maxx∈S va(x), which implies that
r(S, a) = arg minx∈S d(x, a).
A.4 Proof of Proposition 1
Fix any a ∈ Rn++ and define the upper contour set as U(a) := {x ∈ Rn : x  a}.
By assumption U(a) is closed and convex. Since a is a boundary point of U(a) there
is a supporting hyperplane H of U(a) that touches a with orthogonal direction h. Let
r = a − αh for some α and λ be such that r + λei ∈ H for every canonical vector
ei. Because  is strictly convex, there is i∗ such that a  r + λei∗ . By continuity,
a  r + (λ + δ)ei∗ , for δ small. Note that d(a, r + (λ + δ)ei∗) > d(a, r). The continuity
of both  and d implies that for ε small enough, a  r + (λ + δ)ei∗ + ε(1, · · · , 1) and
d(a, r + (λ+ δ)ei∗ + ε(1, · · · , 1)) > d(a, r). Define x := r + (λ+ δ)ei∗ + ε(1, · · · , 1). Then,
the problem ({x, r}, {x, r, a}) does the job.
